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Power Sharing in the World’s Largest Democracy: Informal Consociationalism in 
India (and Its Decline?) 
 
Abstract  
India is one of the most diverse countries of the world but operates with a majoritarian Westminster 
constitution and simple plurality electoral system, albeit also with a federal structure. It was eventually 
coded as consociational by Arend Lijphart (1996) but this coding was questioned by authors such as 
Wilkinson (2000) and Adeney (2002). This article assesses the nature of both de jure and de facto power 
sharing in India over its 70 years of independence and tracks the evolution of de jure and de facto power 
sharing in relation to four dimensions of diversity: religion, caste, territory and language. It questions 
whether the electoral success of Hindu nationalism and the increasing acceptance of ethnic majoritarianism 
has reduced the degree of power-sharing in India. 
Keywords: India, consociationalism, democracy, Hindu nationalism, power sharing  
 
1. Introduction: ‘The Puzzle of Indian Democracy’ revisited   
 
Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism was developed to explain the stabilisation of 
democracy in societies with entrenched cleavages. These were defined as 
‘fragmented but stable democracies’ (1969, 211). Initially focused on explaining the 
cases of the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland, he (and others) 
developed his argument and applied it to cases such as Cyprus (prior to the island’s 
partition), Lebanon (pre and post-civil war), Malaysia, South Africa (interim 
constitution) and Northern Ireland (McCulloch 2014). Consociationalist theory 
posits that deeply divided societies can only survive as democracies if they adopt 
four key features: (1) executive power-sharing through a grand coalition; (2) 
segmental or group autonomy (in the form of cultural, educational or territorial self-
rule); (3) proportionality and (4) minority veto. Lijphart later identified power-
sharing, especially at the executive level, and group autonomy as the two prime 
features of consociational democracy (2002, 39). 
 
Until 1996, Lijphart excluded India from his examples of consociationalism. Yet in 
the 1990s Lijphart admitted that the exclusion of India was a mistake, echoing Paul 
Brass’s (1991, 342) observation that ‘consociationalists ignore the experience of 
India, the largest, most culturally diverse society in the world that has… functioned 
with a highly competitive and distinctly adversarial system of politics.’  Brass argued 
that the omission of India had the potential to undermine the premises on which 
consociational theory rests.  
 
At first sight, India’s political institutions do not fit the key features of 
consociationalism very well. Despite its deep social divisions based on caste, 
religion, tribe, language and territory, the Indian constitution adopted something 
much closer to the adversarial Westminster model. India’s simple plurality electoral 
system mainly generated single party majorities until 1989. India lacks a formal 
requirement to incorporate different groups based on religion, caste or territorial 
origins in its national executive, let alone entrust any of these groups with a veto. 
Although India adopted federalism (its constitution refers to India as a ‘Union’ of 
states and territories), it has many non-federal features, including the right of the 
central parliament to legislate in state matters, and, should the need arise, impose 
direct rule (Article 356 or so-called ‘President’s Rule’).  
 
In spite of this, Lijphart questioned whether ‘Indian democracy is an undiluted 
application of the British [majoritarian] model’ (1977, 180). While India is largely 
lacking in formal consociational features, he noted that there are many informal 
features of the Indian system that are more consociational than majoritarian (1977, 
181). In 1996 Lijphart even went further and argued that India ‘was an impressive 
confirming case” of consociationalism (1996, 259). However, many authors have 
criticised Lijphart’s re-coding of India as consociational (Lustick 1997, Wilkinson 
2000, Adeney 2002), for reasons that will be detailed below.  
 
Indian politics has substantially changed since Lijphart’s 1996 article and the 
rebuttals of Lustick, Wilkinson and Adeney. This makes the case for a re-evaluation 
of the Indian case pressing. Furthermore, although the earlier analyses provided a 
compelling critique of Lijphart’s characterization of India as consociational, they did 
not map systematically the representation of different segments of society in the 
Indian executive or a range of political institutions. In this article we seek to advance 
an original and rigorous assessment of both de jure and de facto levels of 
consociationalism in the Indian case, across time and across different sources of 
diversity, i.e. religion, caste and territory. By adopting a longitudinal and multi-
dimensional approach to the issue, we seek to answer three related questions: (1) 
was Lijphart correct in belatedly classifying India as a confirming case of 
consociationalism? (2) was Lijphart correct in his suggestion that India reached the 
peak of consociationalism during the Nehruvian (1952-1964) period and that 
consociationalism declined thereafter? (3) what has been the effect of the rising 
electoral success of Hindu majoritarianism (with a single party majority in the 2014 
Lok Sabha elections) on the power-sharing features of Indian democracy?  
 
In the remainder of this article, we first summarize Liiphart’s case for considering 
India as a consociational democracy and its critique. Next we identify the methods 
by which we will assess India’s consociational features over time and across a range 
of group dimensions before presenting our analysis. In the conclusion we relate our 
findings to the three questions listed above.  
 
2. Reading India – Lijphart’s consociational interpretation and its critique  
 
India as a consociation? 
 
Lijphart first made the case for India as a consociational democracy in his 1996 
APSR article. In it he argued that ‘Indian democracy has clearly exhibited all four of 
the defining characteristics of power sharing also found in the other prominent 
example of consociational systems’ (1996, 259).  The first criteria of a Grand 
Coalition was met by the fact that the ‘inclusive nature and political dominance [of 
the Indian National Congress (Congress)) has generated grand coalition cabinets 
with ministers belonging to all the main religious, linguistic and regional groups’ 
(1996, 260).  Cultural autonomy was met by linguistic reorganization, the 
educational autonomy afforded to religious and linguistic groups (as well as ‘full 
government financial support’ for these (1996, 260)) and the existence of separate 
personal laws for different religious groups. In spite of Simple Plurality, 
proportionality was met through the fact that ‘plurality does not disfavour 
geographically concentrated minorities’ such as India’s linguistic groups, that the 
Congress Party is the ‘party of consensus,’ and has accorded ‘a share of 
ministerships remarkably close to proportional’ for religious groups (1996, 261). 
He also cited the reserved seats for Scheduled Tribes (STs) and Scheduled Castes 
(SCs) and the reservations for Other Backward Classes (OBCs). He argued that his 
final element, the Minority Veto, was met through citing examples such as the 
retention of English as the additional official language (a veto of the non-Hindi 
speaking states) and the reversal of the Shah Bano judgement (a veto of the Muslim 
community) (1996, 261-2). 
 
Lijphart’s categorisation of India as a consociation has been criticised by Lustick 
(1997), Wilkinson (2000) and Adeney (2002) on three grounds. First, the diversity 
of representatives in the Cabinet that Lijphart cites as evidence of a grand coalition 
were ‘Congressmen and women, very different from an ethnically defined elite 
cartel with authority over and autonomy from the community they represent 
(Adeney 2002, 28). They were ‘token, not representative’ individuals (Lustick 1997, 
115). The second criticism was that ‘although every Indian cabinet had its minority 
representatives, these men and women were kept well away from positions of real 
power’ (Wilkinson 2000, 773).  Finally, rather than this Grand Coalition being a 
‘deliberate or joint stabilizing effort by elites’ it was dependent on one man: Nehru 
(Lustick 1997, 116).   
 
Although Lijphart argues that India met the proportionality criteria with regards to 
caste representation, as Wilkinson analyses, there was a ‘substantial gap between 
the government's promises on minority rights and its performance’; under Nehru 
the ‘actual representation in senior positions was only a tenth of [the SC and ST] … 
allotted quota’ (2000, 773, 771).  The situation in some states was even worse. In 
addition to this, reserved seats for religious minorities in the legislature were 
removed after independence (Wilkinson 2000, 780, 2002, 24-5). Finally, despite 
linguistic reorganization giving linguistically defined states representation in the 
upper house, representation was roughly determined on the basis of population, 
ensuring ‘the domination of the larger populated Hindi-speaking states of the north 
in both the lower and upper chambers of the central legislature’ (Adeney 2002, 23).   
 
Lijphart’s argument that India meets the criteria for Minority Veto was criticized for 
ignoring the evidence pointing in the opposite direction. This not only includes the 
removal of reserved seats for religious minorities but includes the abolition of 
protection for Urdu speakers as well as the ban on cow slaughter in many states 
(Wilkinson 2000, 774-5). As Lustick observes, for Lijphart, ‘[n]o constitutional 
establishment of minority veto is said to be necessary because of crosscutting 
cleavages … that divide the Hindu majority.’ He argues, as have others (Singh 2000) 
that the Indian state adopted many policies that marginalised non-Hindu groups 
(Lustick 1997, 116). 
 
Finally, although there were areas where the Indian state allowed cultural 
autonomy, most notably in terms of the linguistic reorganisation of states 
(Wilkinson 2000, 777), reorganisation was fiercely opposed by Nehru who only 
conceded the demand under ‘the electoral threat that linguistic mobilization posed 
to the Congress’s cohesion’ (Adeney 2007, 96).  As Adeney argues, Nehru 
‘deliberately ignored ethnicity as a means of legitimising the state, basing affiliation 
on a civic notion of territoriality’ (2002, 25). This means that although there may 
have been segmental autonomy in practice, the rationale behind its adoption was a 
non-consociational one. Furthermore, the provisions that provided cultural 
autonomy for the linguistic or religious minorities within the newly created 
linguistic states were routinely ignored (Wilkinson 2000, 778). Despite the 
retention of personal laws for Muslims and Christians, the absence of a minority 
veto resulted in ‘state attacks on minority cultural autonomy’ (2000, 778).  
 
The Decline or Rise of Consociationalism?   
 
Lijphart pointed to a decline in consociationalism after the Nehruvian era. This was 
on the basis that ‘the Congress Party was transformed from an internally democratic, 
federal, and consensual organization to a centralized and hierarchical party.’ 
Lijphart also cites the increasing centralization of the federal system through the 
partisan use of President’s Rule and the increasing support for parties such as the 
BJP who protest at the ‘government’s alleged pandering to minorities’ (1996, 262). 
  
Lijphart’s characterisation has been contested vigorously by Wilkinson who argued 
that, rather than Indian democracy becoming less consociational after Nehru, ‘India 
ha[d] in fact become more consociational’ (2000, 770). The fragmentation of the 
party system from one party dominance played an important role in strengthening 
the consociational traits of India’s federal system. By 2004 Indian democracy had 
cemented itself around two political fronts, the National Democratic Alliance and 
the United Progressive Alliance, entrenching coalition politics and power sharing in 
both pre-electoral and post-electoral pacts (Arora and Kailash 2012). Parties with 
an exclusive regional following entered national coalition politics and were 
expected to use their powers to extract regional benefits or protect regional 
autonomy (Guha Thakurta and Raghuraman 2007).  In this climate of coalition 
politics, the Supreme Court also developed a more activist stance in the policing of 
President’s Rule, preventing its use for purely party political purposes (Sathe 2007, 
Swenden 2016a and b). Furthermore, the transition from a state-led to a more 
market-led economy strengthened the economic autonomy of the states. State 
governments became less bound by central economic regulations and even 
competed against each other for inward economic investment (Rudolph and 
Rudolph 2001). In parallel, the approval of Mandal I and Mandal II extended 
reservations in the civil service (Mandal I) and higher education (Mandal II) to OBCs, 
seeking to reduce the disproportionate influence of Forward Castes in politics, 
administration and higher education (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2009).     
 
However, these overtures towards accommodation on the basis of territory and 
caste were accompanied by the rise of Hindu nationalism as a political and electoral 
force. Until 2014, Hindu nationalist forces could only operate at the level of the 
Indian central state in coalition with secular parties. In the 2014 general elections, 
the Hindu nationalist BJP secured a single party majority of seats in the Lok Sabha. 
Although it is important to stress that it would be more appropriate to talk of Hindu 
communities rather than a single Hindu community, there is a growing acceptance 
of the political ideals associated with the Hindu-right and with it a growing 
willingness to view India as a democracy by and for the Hindus (Jaffrelot 2017). The 
proportion of people agreeing that ‘democracy means following the will of the 
majority community’ has increased (to over 50% of the population) since 2004, and 
it is not just BJP voters who hold this view (Palshikar 2015, 731-2). This is 
significant, because (as we will discuss) as many of the consociational elements of 
India’s political system are de facto rather than de jure ones, they are subject to 
revision. 
 
It follows that for the period between 1996 (the entrenchment of coalition 
government at the centre) and 2014 we find forces that support more 
accommodation based on territory (self-rule) and caste; but we also see the 
weakening of support for accommodation on the basis of religion and (possibly 
given the association between Hindu nationalism and Hindi), language (Adeney 
2015, 12). The alignment of political power with the Hindu right after the 2014 
general elections has the potential to undermine the de facto consociationalism that 
had developed in the era of coalition politics (Sharma and Swenden 2018)).  
 
Based on the literature review we can therefore suggest three propositions which 
will be critically examined in light of the earlier raised questions:  
 
(1) Although not entirely lacking (de facto) elements of power-sharing, 
India did not function as a power-sharing or consociational democracy 
between 1952 and 1989 (confirming Wilkinson and Adeney).  
(2) Following the demise of the one-party system (1989-1996) Indian 
democracy acquired more de facto and de jure consociational properties in 
relation to the accommodation of caste and territory compared with the one-
party dominant phase.  
(3) The rise of Hindu nationalism since the 1980s and the restoration of 
single party government (2014) has negatively impacted the accommodation 
of religious minorities, especially the Muslim community.   
 
3. Methods: Measuring and Interpreting Power-Sharing  
 
To gain a nuanced understanding of consociationalism in India we need to 
rigorously and systematically analyse the different elements of consociationalism 
over time in India, looking at both formal and informal elements of the political 
system. We reject the dichotomous categorisation of India as either consociational 
or non-consociational as it is possible that a political system may have elements of 
consociationalism while lacking others. Instead, we focus on identifying what 
elements of the system are consociational, building on Adeney’s (2002) method of 
scoring elements of different parts of consociationalism. Unlike Adeney, we also 
consider the more informal elements that may be present within a system to more 
accurately reflect the de facto operation of the system. These informal elements may 
relate to the ‘conventional’ practice of dispersing office in the executive, highest 
courts of the land or military post-holders across different ethno-linguistic or 
territorial groups. They may also be reflected in the internal organisation of political 
parties (Bogaards 2014).  In addition to assessing the absolute representation of 
different groups in many of these key institutions, we calculate the deviation from 
proportionality from the representation of a particular group based on their share 
of the population in decennial population censuses since 1951. Relaying 
representational data to different census points reflects that the share of the 
population who belong to a certain caste group, reside in a certain state or union 
territory, or practice a particular religion varies across time and space; reflecting 
migration patterns or variable population growth figures of different groups. For 
example, the Muslim population has increased from 9.8% in 1951, to 14.2% in 2011, 
and the Southern states’ population has decreased vis-a-vis the North. We only use 
fixed population shares for caste (based on the Mandal Commission report, Jayal 
2006) since until 2011 Indian population censuses did not ask respondents to 
identify with caste affiliation (and the relevant findings of the 2011 census have not 
yet been published). For regional affiliation we use regional groups which 
correspond with the regional zones and zonal councils in India, i.e. North, Central, 
East, South and West (Inter-State Council 2018) plus the North-East. We accept that 
tabulating groups according to their religion runs the risk of assuming that these 
groups are more homogeneous than they are. This applies both for majorities (such 
as ‘Hindus’) as well as minorities (such as ‘Muslims’). However, we also disaggregate 
the Hindu community according to region and caste to overcome this problem. 
 




India does not have a formal grand coalition. The Cabinet and government are 
formed by the party that can command a majority in the Lok Sabha and the Prime 
Minster is (normally) the leader of the largest party in the parliament. The President 
– the Head of State - is elected by an electoral college including national and state 
assemblies, and cohabits with the government after an election – something that has 
become more important as the role of the President has become more activist, 
particularly in relation to the use of Emergency powers of the constitution. As there 
is no formal requirement that the (coalition) government represents different 
segments of India’s population, we concentrate on three elements to score the 
informal existence (or otherwise) of a grand coalition: (1) the existence of members 
of groups within the Cabinet; (2) the ministerial portfolios held by different groups 
and (3) the existence of groups within the two largest polity-wide parties: the INC 
and the BJP, following Bogaards’ recommendation to focus on intra-party 
representation as an additional measure of consociationalism in a political system 
(2014, 110). We consider each of these in turn.  
 
Group representation in Cabinet  
 
Using an original data set compiled by [insert reference here] our calculations 
include those members of the Council of Ministers who hold Cabinet Rank, excluding 
Deputy Ministers or Ministers of State. We have tabulated the members of the 
Cabinet by religious, caste/tribal and regional identity. Although authors have 
argued that the composition of the Cabinet reflects India’s diversity (Lijphart 1996, 
Wilkinson 2000, Bogaards 2014), there have been few systematic evaluations of 
how this has changed over time and varies across different sources of diversity e.g. 
region compared to religion (Panandiker and Mehra 1996, Jayal 2006).  
 
Figure 1: Deviation from proportionality in the Union Cabinet (1947-2018) 




Source: 1947-2000 Kohli (2000), 2000-2018 compiled from https://archive.india.gov.in, 
https://www.india.gov.in/my-government/whos-who/council-ministers Given their very small 
numbers, Parsis  and Buddhists have been subsumed under Others or N/A.  
 
For a Grand Coalition to materialize, groups that are small within the polity should 
be over-represented so that their voice is adequately heard. As Figure 1 reveals, 
despite making up 80% of the population, Hindus comprised more than 90% of 
recent Cabinets, especially those led by the Hindu nationalist BJP. In contrast, 
Muslims are the most under-represented, at least in Cabinets that have been formed 
since the 1990s. However, as noted above, Hindus are not a united community. As 
Table 1 demonstrates, variations in the geographical strength of the lead party in 
central government have affected the representation of different regions. For 
instance, factional infighting within Congress after the 1967 elections and the rise 
of the backward castes eroding Congress support in the Hindi belt during the 1990s 
generated a considerable under-representation of MPs from the Central states 
(which include the Hindi belt states) in the Cabinets of Indira Gandhi (1967-1975) 
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Table 1: Deviation from proportionality in the Union Cabinet based on region 
1947-2018  
 
Cabinet Year North Central East South  West 
North-
East 
Nehru I 47-52 1.22 -7.08 1.45 -8.45 15.87 -2.88 
Nehru II 50-52 3.71 -7.08 -2.98 -8.45 15.87 -2.88 
Nehru III 52-57 4.42 10.27 -12.08 -1.19 1.46 -2.88 
Nehru IV 57-62 2.76 13.34 -10.02 -0.19 -1.35 -3.34 
Nehru V 62-64 3.3 -2.42 -5.13 5.24 3.54 -3.34 
LBS 64-66 2.06 -6.51 1.01 4.22 3.8 -3.34 
IG 66-67 2.76 -12.1 -3.77 -6.44 17.4 2.91 
IG 67-71 1.24 -14.83 -5.7 4.35 10.76 4.72 
IG 71-77 11.32 -3.81 -6.06 -5.45 -1.34 6.07 
M Desai 77-79 1.8 7.96 -3.9 -10.57 8.38 -3.67 
Charan Singh 79-80 -2.32 14.24 -2.98 -0.41 -4.83 -3.67 
I Gandhi 80-84 4.16 0.14 1.92 3.9 -6.35 -3.67 
Rajiv Gandhi 84-89 16.29 7.39 -6.46 -8.59 -4.97 -3.67 
VP Singh 89-90 9.95 13.33 -10.88 4.42 -8.82 1.77 
Nashima Rao 91-96 1.57 6.98 -7.71 1.65 10.63 -0.28 
A B Vajpayee  96-96 12.73 10.56 -13.66 -15.02 18.96 -3.78 
HD Gowda 96-97 2.75 -0.16 6.58 19.5 -14.37 0.98 
IK Gujral 97-98 -3.41 -10.59 11.27 21 -14.51 -3.79 
A B Vajpayee 98-99 3.07 -8.87 -6.06 2.15 13.49 -3.79 
A B Vajpayee  99-04 6.57 -7.8 4.76 -9.66 9.88 -3.79 
M Singh 04-'09 0.83 -7.67 -1.42 8.84 -0.75 -0.35 
M Singh 04-'09 9.52 -12.22 -12.9 4.43 11.19 0.01 
N Modi 14-18 2.03 4.87 -7.18 12.83 8.77 -3.78 
 1947-2018 4.28 -0.52 -4.00 0.79 4.03 -1.58 
 1947-1989 4.06 -0.04 -4.21 -2.46 4.48 -1.51 
 Post 1989 4.56 -1.16 -3.72 5.01 3.45 -1.68 
 Post 1996 3.05 -6.06 -0.71 8.44 1.96 -2.07 
 
Source: Jayal (2006, 155, 159) for 1947-2004, authors’ calculations 2009-14 and 2014-18. North 
(Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Rajasthan as well as Chandigarh and Delhi); 
Centre (Chattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Uttar Pradesh); East (Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha and 
West Bengal), West (Goa, Gujarat, Maharahsthra as well as the union territories of Dadra and Nagar Haveli 
and Daman and Diu), South (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Telangana and Tamil Nadu as well as 
union territories Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Pondicherry and Lakshadweep); North-East (Assam, 
Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalalya, Mizoram, Nagaland Sikkim and Tripura). 
 
The change from a one-party dominant system to a multiparty system has increased 
regional representation, particularly for the states in the South and the West of the 
country. However, very few Indian Cabinets have compensated the small size and 
geographically isolated position of the North-Eastern states by offering them 
Cabinet berths above their demographic share in the population. And the Central 
and Eastern regions have not been proportionally represented either, interestingly 
given that these contain many of the Hindi heartland states. 
 
Figure 2 demonstrates that the OBCs, SCs and STs have been consistently under-
represented in senior executive positions, notwithstanding the presence of 
legislative reservations benefiting the SCs and STs. The demographically small 
Forward Castes are over-represented, reflecting their dominant socio-economic 
position in Indian society. The exceptions to this are the short-lived United Front 
coalition cabinets (1996-1998) in which parties representing lower caste interests 
assumed a key role. Their replacement by the more elite-led Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) and the Congress since 1998 restored the dominance of the Forward Castes.  
  
Figure 2: Deviation from proportionality in the Union Cabinet (1947-2018) 




Source: 1947-2004 adapted from Jayal (2006, 154, 158). 2009-2018 calculated by X. Caste affiliation 
also includes religious minorities with an identifiable caste. Percentages exclude ‘others’. The deviation 
from proportionality scores are slightly skewed by the fact that we have had to use the Forward Caste Hindu 
percentages of the population to calculate the Forward Caste Deviation from Proportionality, even though 
there are some Forward Caste non-Hindus included in the data.  
 
Based on Cabinet representation alone, these data provide mixed support for the 
thesis by Wilkinson that the consociational features of India have strengthened in 
the post-Nehruvian period. Despite the decline of the one-party dominant system, 
the rise of the OBCs, albeit more prominent in the Lok Sabha (see below) is not 
strongly reflected in Cabinet representation, and although some regions of India 
such as the South have achieved greater representation at cabinet level, other areas 
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support for religious accommodation, we find clear evidence of the progressively 
deteriorating representation of the largest religious minority group, the Muslims.  
 
Ministerial Portfolio Allocation in Cabinet  
 
Turning to the position held by ministers in the Cabinet, a better way of assessing 
influence, we concentrate on religious minorities for reasons of space. Wilkinson 
argued that ‘even when minorities were given ministerial appointments, they were 
kept well away from the most important and sensitive posts’ (2000, 779). In Table 
2 we have tabulated their religious identity according to appointment. Although 
some may dispute Wilkinson’s contention that the education portfolio is a ‘less 
important’ ministry, it is widely accepted that the portfolios of Finance, Home and 
Foreign Affairs are the most coveted.  
 
Table 2: Religious breakdown of Union Cabinet positions held by religious 
minorities 1947-2018  
 
 Muslim Christian Sikh Others 
Finance 0 1 1 0 
External 3 0 2 0 
Home 1 0 2 0 
Defence 0 2 2 0 
Health 4 1 1 0 
Industry 3 1 3 0 
Education 3 0 0 0 
Agriculture/Irrigation 4 0 5 1 
Urban Dev/Housing 4 0 4 0 
Natural Resources/Energy 9 0 1 0 
Info & Broadcasting/Communications 3 1 1 1 
Transport 8 3 2 0 
Labour/Employment 3 0 0 0 
Min Affairs 5 0 0 0 
Others 11 2 10 3 
 
Source: Kohli (2000) for 1947-2000. 2000-2018 compiled from https://archive.india.gov.in, 
https://www.india.gov.in/my-government/whos-who/council-ministers .  
 
Our data indicate that the picture is mixed. There has been limited representation 
of religious minorities in the finance portfolio, with just one Christian and one Sikh 
minister in the first Nehruvian and Rao cabinets respectively.  In relation to the 
‘sensitive’ portfolio of External Affairs the picture is slightly more nuanced.  A 
Christian held this position in the 1966-7 Cabinet of Indira Gandhi and retained the 
brief in 1967. Muslims occupied the External Affairs brief in the short-lived first 
Cabinet of A B Vajpayee and the Manmohan Singh cabinet.  Only one Sikh has held 
this role, albeit for a 5 year period between 1966-71.  
 
The Home Brief has only been held once by a Muslim under the premiership of VP 
Singh in the National Front coalition - and for less than a year. It has been held twice 
by a Sikh, Giani Zail Singh under Indira Gandhi’s final administration (between 1980 
and 1982, before he was appointed as President of the Indian Union, allegedly in a 
bid to appease Sikhs (Hazarika 1994)) and later by another Sikh, in Rajiv Gandhi’s 
administration during the continuing violence in the Punjab (Chawla 1988) 
 
The Defence brief, one of those identified by Wilkinson as being too ‘sensitive’ to be 
allocated to a Muslim (2000, 779) has never been allocated to a Muslim. Two 
Christians have occupied this position – one in the second and third Vajpayee 
cabinets and one in UPA cabinets headed by Manmohan Singh.  Two Sikhs have also 
held the Defence brief; one in Nehru’s first cabinet of 1947 and 1953, and another 
in two of Indira Gandhi’s administrations. Interestingly, despite their 
preponderance in the army (see further), no Sikh has held either Defence or 
External Affairs since 1974.  
 
A few other patterns emerge.  In the Nehruvian era, Muslims held the majority of the 
Education minister portfolios: an important element for segmental autonomy.  Since 
its creation in 2006, the Ministry for Minority Affairs has always been allocated to a 
Muslim member of the Cabinet. The other notable pattern has been the fact that 
Sikhs have held a large number of positions related to Food and Agriculture. This is 
potentially relevant, although beyond the purview of this paper, because Punjab is 
the ‘agricultural basket’ of India and its allocation to Sikhs in several different 
cabinets, all of whom have their base in, or were directly elected from, Punjab is also 
potentially indicative of segmental autonomy.   
 
Group representation in the two main polity-wide parties.  
 
For the final assessment of the existence of an informal grand coalition, we discuss 
group representation within the party executives of the INC and BJP. Both polity-
wide parties have established organizational divisions or cells that look after the 
representation of certain group interests such as the All-India-Adivasi Congress cell, 
(Indian National Congress, 2018) or ‘morchas’ aimed at channelling the interests of 
STs, SCs, OBCs, Kisans or peasants and religious minorities within the BJP (BJP 
2018). However, these bodies do not necessarily wield influence in terms of party 
policy and candidate selection. To assess this, one needs to look more systematically 
at the composition of the party national executives, i.e. the Congress Working 
Committee (CWC) and the BJP national executive (and parliamentary board).  
Drawing from Jayal (2006, 176) we reproduce data that correspond with key 
periods in the history of Congress and the BJP. We focus on the evolution in the 
representation of religious minorities and expect to find a significant difference 
between the profile of both parties based on Congress’ secular outlook and the BJP’s 
profile as a Hindu nationalist party.  
 
  
Figure 3: Over/Under representation of religious groups in Congress Working 
Committee (select years 1952-2018) 
 
 
Source: Kochanek (1968, 365) for 1946-52, Jayal (2006, 176) for 1972-2002, Congress Party web-
site for data 2016 and 2018: https://www.inc.in/en/congress-working-committee/members 
 
Figure 3 reveals that Christians and Sikhs have generally been well represented 
within Congress, but the representation of the more sizable Muslim minority within 
Congress’ key decision-making body has been patchier. This is so notwithstanding 
the importance of the party’s Muslim ‘vote-bank’ (Palshikar and Suri 2014). Whilst 
Muslims were significantly over-represented in the party’s 2002 national executive, 
this is no longer the case for the most recently formed executives, including the first 
executive with Rahul Gandhi as party president in 2017.  
 
In comparison, and as expected, Figure 4 shows that the underrepresentation of 
religious minorities within the national executive of the BJP is more systematic, 
affecting Christian and Muslims in particular. The level of Muslim under-
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Figure 4: Over/Under representation of religious groups in the BJP National 
Executive (select years 1983-2018)  
 
 
Source: Jayal (2006, 179) and BJP party web-site for composition of 95 member-strong National 




The stronger the participation of minority groups in key decision-making bodies of 
the state such as the Cabinet, the more likely policies can be expected to 
accommodate group sensitivities (i.e. generate ‘substantive’ representation). 
Although an assessment of ‘outcome’ indicators falls beyond the scope of this article, 
for Lijphart minority groups should be able to ‘veto’ proposals that undermine their 
rights and autonomy in a consociational democracy (2017, 3).  
 
In India, certain group rights are constitutionally entrenched. Some of these rights 
are not only protected against majoritarian revision (special bicameral majorities 
are required to amend the constitution, protecting linguistic, religious and lower 
caste groups), but occasionally also against any forms of political revision. Indeed, 
in 1973 the Supreme Court ruled that the ‘basic structure’ of the constitution could 
not be amended. In time, this ruling has been understood to rule out constitutional 
amendments which undermine among others (the secular and federal character of 
the constitution; and a set of individual rights and freedoms (as specified in Part III 
of the constitution) (Chinappa 2008, 60).  
 
Secularism has to be understood as India’s pledge to apply an equidistant approach 
to the various religious communities, rather than as a means to separate state and 
religion.  In colonial times, personal law practices for each religion, adjudicated by 









Hindu Muslim Sikh Christian
1983 1991 1998 2002 2018
inheritance, custody and adoption (Lerner 2011, 135-47). While the constitution did 
not rule out their continuation, such practices could not conflict with fundamental 
human rights. Furthermore, during the Constituent Assembly Debates, discussions 
unfolded on the replacement of these religious personal laws with a Universal Civil 
Code (UCC) binding on all religions (Harel-Shalev 2009, 186-7). The Muslim 
minority exercised its informal veto and eventually a UCC was retained only as a 
non-justiciable directive principle (a principle of ‘intent’) informing Indian state 
policy. For the first decades after independence, the Supreme Court did not strike 
down personal law unless it had been invalidated by parliamentary legislation.  
 
Since the secular Congress commanded a vast majority of seats it quickly used its 
majority to revise Hindu Personal Law and enact a Hindu Code Bill (1956). This Bill 
prohibited discrimination on the basis of caste and extended inheritance rights to 
Hindu female children. Around the same period, the Lok Sabha also passed the 
Untouchable Offences Act, making the practice of ‘untouchability’ a criminal offence. 
The parliamentary imposition of a Hindu Code opened up some discrepancies with 
Muslim personal law (for instance on issues such as polygamy, divorce and 
inheritance) and strengthened calls for a UCC, or, at the very least, a comparable 
Muslim Code. However, protests, especially from orthodox Muslim associations, 
persuaded senior Congress leaders that it should be left to Muslims to decide on the 
revision of Muslim Personal Law. Despite this, in 1973, the Congress-led 
government headed by Indira Gandhi amended section 125 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code so that the same maintenance provisions would apply for all 
divorcees throughout India, irrespective of their religion. According to some 
Muslims this provision contravened Muslim Personal Law (Nelson 2013, 241). This 
issue resurfaced in 1985, when the Supreme Court in Shah Bano invoked Article 125 
to enforce the payment of a maintenance allowance for divorcees from their ex-
husbands beyond the three-month period and ruled that doing so was ‘within the 
spirit of shari’ah’. The latter enraged the Muslim Personal Law Board and sections 
of the Congress’ Muslim vote bank forced Congress to ‘overrule’ the Supreme Court 
judgement and enact the Muslim Women’s (Protection of Right on Divorce) Act 
1986. In this instance, the Muslim minority exercised its veto-right to restore the 
authority of the Muslim Personal Law Board in an aspect of personal law (Nelson 
2013, 240-1). The promise to create a UCC has been a staple of BJP manifestos  and 
in October 2016 the BJP Government filed a supportive affidavit in the Supreme 
Court seeking to ‘challenge the constitutional validity of the practices of triple talaq 
(talaq-e-bidaf), nikah halala and polygamy [which] raises matters of abiding 
significance in relation to the status and dignity of Muslim women’ (Livelaw News 
Network 2016). Few doubted that this stance reflected a wider commitment to a 
UCC. Following this affidavit, in August 2017 the Supreme Court declared ‘triple 
talaq’ unconstitutional and requested the central government to promulgate a law 
to regulate marriage and divorce within the Muslim community (Rajagopal 2017). 
To this effect the BJP government introduced the Muslim Women (Protection of 
Rights on Marriage) Bill 2017, which criminalized triple talaq with a possible 
imprisonment of the husband for up to three years (at the time of the dissolution of 
the Lok Sabha in 2019 the Bill had not been passed in the Rajya Sabha). 
 
The ability of religious minorities to defend their customs has also come under 
threat in other areas. Most notably, the Indian constitution acknowledged strong 
pressures to protect the cow (a sacred animal in Hinduism) by urging states to 
prohibit the slaughter of cows or draught animals which could pull carts or ploughs. 
This provision, like the UCC, was only inserted as a directive principle, putting it 
beyond the purview of judicial enforcement (Kazmin 2017, 25). Although many 
states banned the slaughter of productive cattle in the 1950s, this ban did not apply 
to aged cattle.  With the electoral success of Hindu nationalism, beef bans have been 
more rigorously enforced (often by cow vigilante groups or gau rakshaks rather 
than the state police (Jaffrelot 2017)). In May 2017 the central government passed 
a decree (which ensured that it did not have to be debated in parliament) that ‘no 
person shall bring a cattle (sic) to an animal market unless upon arrival he has 
furnished a written declaration … stating that the cattle has not been brought to 
market for sale for slaughter’ (Ministry of Environment 2017). The Supreme Court’s 
suspension of this order in July 2017 citing ‘the hardship that the ban on the sale of 
cattle for slaughter had imposed’ (Reuters 2017) is indicative that important levels 
of protection for minorities remain. But the reduced tolerance for cultural practices 
(personal law, beef consumption) associated with minority religious groups 
symbolises the gradual erosion of their influence in time and the weakening of the 
minority veto.   Although there have been many prominent commissions looking at 
concerns of religious minorities in India, most recently the Sachar Commission in 
2006, focusing on the ‘Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim 
community in India, these commissions have generally been distinguished by the 
absence of concrete changes e.g. the limited number of prosecutions against the 
perpetrators of the anti-Sikh violence in Delhi in 1984. 
 
The principle of a minority veto applies more firmly to policies which pertain to 
divisions that cross-cut the Hindu majority community, namely, caste and region 
(and the linked issue of language). The implementation of the Mandal Commission, 
introducing reservations for OBCs in administrative and educational positions, 
faced strong resistance from Forward Caste Hindus when it was first announced. 
However, its recommendations were implemented when political parties 
representing Backward Castes came to political power. Now ‘the political arithmetic 
of reservations is so overwhelming that no major politician will come out openly 
against them’ (Wilkinson 2010, 266), rather, reservations continue to be extended 
(The Economic Times 2019). 
 
Similarly, the linguistic diversity within the Hindu community as a whole required 
a carefully crafted constitutional and institutional compromise, which has governed 
India’s language policy since the 1960s.  For more than half of Hindus, mainly in the 
South of the country, Hindi is not their mother language. They successfully 
prevented the removal of English as a joint official language (Adeney 2007, 94). The 
linguistic reorganization of India in the 1950s also ensured that the states, 
controlled by India’s multiple linguistic groups, have a say in constitutional 
amendments affecting the federal balance of power e.g. over the distribution of 
powers between the Union and the states and the representation of states in 
Parliament (although, interestingly not over the official language of India). The 
strength of regional identity in the Dravidian South, especially in Tamil Nadu, has 
sensitized South Indian communities to attempts to marginalize their political 
influence. They have secured a certain degree of over-representation in the Indian 
Parliament. Despite Article 81 of the constitution which recommends that ‘seat 
allocation in such manner that the ratio between the number and the population of 
the state is, so far as practical, the same for all states’ parliament in 1976 amended 
the Constitution to freeze the strength of the Lok Sabha and state legislatures until 
the 2001 census. This article was inserted in order not to penalise the more effective 
family planning control policies of the Southern states compared with the more 
populous states of the Hindi belt (especially the Central regions). The provision was 
extended in 2001 until 2026. A de facto minority veto therefore operates with 
regard to smaller linguistic groups, although, as noted above, constitutionally, the 
official language of the Indian Union can be changed by a two thirds majority in both 




Lijphart argued that proportionality ‘is a method of allocating civil service 
appointments and scare financial resources in the form of government subsidies 
among the different segments’ (1977, 38). Furthermore, ‘not only should all 
significant segments be represented in decision-making organs, but they should also 
be represented proportionally’ (1977, 39).  India has formal proportionality of the 
Lijphartean type only in regards to SC and ST representation in the Lok Sabha, 
bureaucracy and higher education institutions. In 1994 administrative reservations 
were extended to OBCs for up to 27% of places, following the implementation of the 
Mandal Report (Jayal 2006, 162). These were further extended to higher education 
in the 2000s (Chauhan 2008). Despite the provision of formal reservations in many 
institutions, these reserved positions are not always filled. Furthermore, we need to 
consider informal measures of proportionality in relation to non-caste groups. 
These include the representation of different religious and linguistic groups in the 
Lok Sabha and key institutions of the state over time.   
 
Proportionality in the Lok Sabha  
 
Reserved seats and administrative and educational reservations have certainly 
helped to improve the representation of SCs and STs. In the Lok Sabha, 84 seats 
(15.46%) are reserved for SCs and 47 (8.66%) for STs. Consequently, their level of 
representation stands in line with their share of the population as a whole. 2 seats 
are also reserved for members of the Anglo-Indian community.  However, SCs in 
particular obtain very few general seats, typically only around five (1.2% of general 
category seats). Parties either do not field SC candidates in these seats (even though 
they are not barred from standing) or, as is the case for the Bahujan Samaj Party  
(BSP), a party that seeks to give voice to the Dalits, Dalit candidates are only fielded 
where their chances for success are marginal, i.e. outside of Uttar Pradesh where the 
BSP has a limited following (The Hindu 2016). In the case of STs however, the 
number of seats from non-reserved constituencies is generally higher, usually 
around 10 (Jayal 2006, 145). This may reflect the more concentrated character of 
ST populations in some seats which are not reserved, meaning that they are able to 
secure representation in simple plurality electoral contests.  
 
Unlike SCs and STs, OBCs do not benefit from reserved seats. This has had major 
implications for their level of underrepresentation as Figure 5 demonstrates. 
Although Hindu OBCs saw a marginal improvement in the Lok Sabha from the 1980s, 
reflecting a strengthening of their representation in the states of the Northern and 
Central regions of the so-called Hindi-belt (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2009), since 2009 
the level of OBC representation in the Lok Sabha has declined (Jaffrelot and Verniers 
2015). It continues to fall well short both of the 27% reservation quota for OBCs in 
the bureaucracy and higher educational institutions, and their share of the 
population. 
 




Source: Calculations authors’ own. (Jayal 2006, Shankar and Rodrigues 2011, Trivedi unpublished 
dataset Lok Sabha 1952-2014). Numbers do not round to 100% due to the small number of 
candidates not able to be classified by caste or religion.  
 
Reserved seats were removed for religious minorities after independence. Many 
have argued that religious minorities have become under-represented as a result 
(Khalidi 1993, Sachar 2006).  Of the minority religious communities, the Muslims 
are the most under-represented Their level of under-representation has 
progressively increased since the late 1980s. The tally of 20 MPs in the 16th Lok 
Sabha was the lowest figure ever; the governing BJP did not have a single Muslim 
among its 282 MPs. The degree of under-representation is generally lower for the 
Sikh, Christian and Buddhist minorities.  
 
Proportionality in Administrative Positions (Central Government Services) 
 
SCs and STs benefit from affirmative action policies in India.  Places are reserved for 
these groups in civil service and educational posts. These reserved places were 
extended to the OBCs in the civil service when the Mandal Report was implemented 
in 1994, and to educational places in 2006. Figure 7 reproduces the representation 
of SCs (Dalits) in central government jobs by employment category. Category A jobs 
reflect the highest status and level of responsibility (typically associated with senior 
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lowest level of responsibility (and can include menial jobs such as sweeping).  Figure 
6 reveals that SCs remain slightly under-represented in the prestigious category A 
jobs (despite an increase in the 1980s) although their position is improving. In 
contrast, SCs are overrepresented in the lower, menial category D job bracket. 
Although not reproduced below, government employment for STs demonstrate a 
similar pattern.  
 
Figure 6: Deviation from Proportionality for SCs (Dalits) in Central 




Source: 1965-2003 Jodhka (2012), 2003-2015 Annual Reports of the National Commission for Scheduled 
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Figure 7: Deviation from OBC (Hindu) share of the population in central 




Source: 2004-14 Annual Reports from the National Commission for Scheduled Castes 
http://ncsc.nic.in/pages/display/47, 2017 estimate: The Hindu (2017)  
 
Although the introduction of OBC reservations has increased the representation of 
OBC in government jobs, OBCs remain significantly under-represented across all 
categories. Figure 7 demonstrates that OBC representation falls short of meeting 
even the 27% OBC quota, let alone their share of the Hindu population (44%), across 
all four categories. More often than not jobs that are earmarked for OBCs are not 
filled (e.g. in the case of category A jobs because not enough candidates from 
disadvantaged background present themselves or meet the relevant entry 
requirements). However, reserved positions were only created in 1994, and, there 
is evidence of some improvement in the numbers of OBCs being appointed to senior 
positions over the last 15 years. 
 
This is in contrast to the Muslim communities. The absence of group specific quotas 
has hampered the representation of religious minorities in central government 
services, especially Muslims. Table 3 lists their representation during two data 
points for which information could be found, 1980 and 2006. IAS, IPS (Indian Police 
Services) and IFS (Indian Forest Services) posts are the most prestigious among the 
category A jobs. The representation of Muslims in these posts is 10% or more below 
their share of the population. Put differently, the share of Muslims is between a sixth 
or a third (depending on the type of service) of what it should be. The Narendra 
Modi government claimed that it was trying to redress this imbalance: its 2014-
2015 intake comprised close to 9% of ‘minorities’ (Annual Report of Minority Affairs 
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Table 3: Representation of Muslims in Central Government Services 1980 and 
2006  
 








Total Central Services  6.80 NA  
 
Source: (Saxena 1983, Sachar 2006) 
 
Key Political, Military and Judicial Offices  
 
Finally, in consociational systems, key political, judicial or military offices are often 
held by different communities to strengthen their political and symbolic 
representation within the state. Figures 8 and 9 list the distribution of these offices 
in the period between 1947 and 2018 (March) based on religion and region.  
 
Figure 8. The deviation from proportionality of key office holders 1947-2018  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Presidential web-site, Supreme Court web-site, List of army 
Chief Officers of Staff and list of Lok Sabha speakers.  
 
Figure 8 shows that Hindus have been over-represented as Supreme Court Chief 
Justices but under-represented in the Presidential Office. Muslims have been 
underrepresented in all high offices except for that of the President: 4 of India’s 17 
Presidents thus far have been Muslim (Zakir Hussain, 1967-69, Mohammed 
Hidaytullah but only for a month in 1969, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed Aug 74- February 
77 and Abdul Kalam 2002-2007). With the exception of the office of Chief Justice, 
Sikhs have been over-represented, least surprisingly so in the army, given the 
colonial legacy of designating Sikhs as a ‘martial race’ (Wilkinson 2015). Figure 8 
does not list the caste or tribal designation of Hindu office-bearers. Based on our 













been SCs. Although we have not listed it in Figure 8, India’s most important political 
office, that of the Prime Minister, has always been occupied by Forward Caste 
Hindus, except for Narendra Modi (the first OBC Prime Minister) and his 
predecessor Manmohan Singh, a Sikh. Both these Prime Ministers were of the two 
main national parties, but the fact that they took office in the era of coalition politics 
is further evidence that Indian politics has become more inclusive in the coalition 
politics era.  
 
Of the offices listed above, the Supreme Court Chief Justice renders decisions in a 
collective manner since judgements require majority support in benches of three or 
more judges. Yet, as for other political institutions, the representation of Muslims is 
weak and has been declining. There have been 18 Muslim judges thus far, but 
whereas Muslims made up 16% of the Court in the 1950s, their share dropped to 
about 4% between 2000 and 2009. With a few exceptions the Court consistently had 
two Muslim judges serving on it until the end of the 1990s, but following retirements 
in 2016, it was without a Muslim judge until February 2017 (The Indian Express 
2016a). This Muslim judge (alongside a Hindu, a Sikh and the Courts’ only Christian 
and Parsi judges) issued the historic Triple Talaq judgement, which we discuss 
below (Rajagopal 2017). To have a multi-faith bench decide on issues such as these 
is important since it underlines a shared (or at least majority) understanding of how 
to interpret the secular nature of the Indian state and the role of various religions 
therein.  Muslims only make up 4% of all state high court judges (The Quint 2016). 
Lower castes are also significantly underrepresented in the Supreme Court. 
Chandrachud’s (2014) detailed study shows that no OBC, SC or ST judge was 
appointed until the 1980s, the first two Dalit judges entered the Supreme Court in 
1989 and 2000; the latter, KG Balakrishan, would be elevated to the post of Chief 
Justice in January 2007). Since his retirement in 2010 (at least up until May 2016), 
no High Court judge belonging to a SC or ST has been elevated to the Supreme Court 
(The Indian Express 2016b). Although OBCs made up close to 30% of new Supreme 
Court appointees during the 1980s, their share of new appointments dropped to 
between 10 and 20% in the following decades (Chandrachud 2014, 254-58). As such, 
we do not observe a considerable rise in lower caste representation in the Supreme 
Court.  
 
Finally, the allocation of key offices to regions provides a broad picture of the extent 
to which the polity is geographically inclusive. Figure 9 confirms a few patterns 
already observed above. The small North-Eastern region is extremely under-
represented. The regions of the North and West have produced more army chiefs 
than the regions of the East and Central area, again, reflecting path-dependent 
legacies of perceived ‘martial races’ during colonial times (Sikhs, Jats, Rajputs) from 
North and West India (Wilkinson 2015, 154-191) The populous, but relatively poor 
Central zone (including the states of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh) has been 
under-represented in all four offices identified. In the case of the Speaker’s office 
this may be due to the weakness of the Congress in the Hindi belt from the late 1980s.  
 
  
Figure 9: Deviation from Proportionality for office holders based on region 
 
 
Source: As Figure 9 
 
Segmental Autonomy  
 
The final area we assess relates to segmental autonomy. Segmental autonomy 
entails ‘the delegation of rule-making and rule-application powers to the segments’; 
important for providing groups with the right to make decisions over issues which 
affect only their group, as opposed to those over which there is ‘common interest’ 
(Lijphart 1977, 41). This is an area of India where there are more formal safeguards 
at least for linguistic, religious and territorially concentrated minorities. 
 
In relation to formal territorial and linguistic segmental autonomy, the provisions 
of the Indian constitution that states can choose the language(s) in which they 
operate and communicate with the Indian Union was a form of segmental autonomy 
that was strengthened after the linguistic reorganization of states in the 1950s and 
the Official Language Act of 1967. This decision contrasted with the policy of 
neighbouring Pakistan that not only initially imposed one official language – Urdu - 
on the entire population but also refused the right of provinces to adopt provincial 
languages for use within their territory (Adeney 2007, 80). Linguistic 
reorganization in India thus secured the right of linguistic majorities at a regional 
level to implement their own cultural and educational decisions. The STs of India 
also possess territorial segmental autonomy through the provisions of the Sixth 
Schedule to the constitution regarding cultural protection and exceptions to 
national laws. As Tillin has discussed, this constitutes a form of asymmetrical 
federalism (2007). There is no provision for segmental autonomy along territorial 
lines. Although Kashmir possesses a special status under Article 370 of the 
constitution and non-Kashmiris are prohibited from purchasing property in the 
state, this is a result of the terms of the accession to the Indian Union rather than 
explicit religious segmental autonomy.  
 
Formally speaking state autonomy is not secure. Article 266 of the constitution 














a matter of national concern. More importantly, by invoking emergency powers (so-
called President’s Rule as per Article 356 of the constitution), the central 
government can suspend state autonomy. However, although frequently abused for 
party political purposes under one party dominant rule, the Supreme Court in its 
Bommai judgement (1994) adopted a much more restrictive reading of the 
conditions under which President’s Rule can be legitimately invoked. Consequently, 
the incidence of President’s Rule has reduced considerably (Swenden 2016b, 500-
501). In 2016 the Supreme Court not only struck down the application of President’s 
Rule in the states of Uttarakhand and Arunachal Pradesh, but reinstated the two 
disposed Congress-ruled governments, an action it had never undertaken before 
(Saxena and Swenden 2018).  At the time of writing the state of Kashmir remains 
under a controversially imposed President’s (Governor’s) Rule. The de facto 
autonomy of the states has also been enhanced as a result of economic liberalization 
(Rudolph and Rudolph 2001), and the decline of the one-party dominant system, 
requiring national parties to make alliances with regionally based political parties. 
 
In relation to non-territorial segmental autonomy, the retention of Muslim and 
Christian personal laws, already discussed under the mutual veto section of this 
paper, fits the criteria. It is notable that this does not extend to Sikh, Buddhist or Jain 
personal laws, constitutionally described as being ‘Hindu’. However, as above, 
personal laws are coming under pressure in India. It is too soon to predict their 
abolition, but the changing political discourse surrounding the legitimacy of 
retaining laws is a threat to their continued existence. Constitutionally linguistic 
groups have the right to preserve their language even outside states where it is a 
recognised language (or, indeed, in the case of those languages such as Sindhi, where 
it is not a state language). However, as the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities 
Report makes clear (2014) these constitutional provisions are upheld more in the 
breach than in the observance.  
 
In relation to caste, no formal segmental autonomy provisions exist. The Indian 
constitution prohibits the practice of Untouchability and the 1955 Untouchability 
(Offences) Act specifies sanctions, including imprisonment, for those that practice 
it. The provisions for uplifting backward castes (SCs and OBC) as discussed in the 
proportionality section of this article are designed to undermine the occupational 
basis of the caste system. None of this however can detract from the fact that the 
divisions of society on the basis of the caste system are still a lived experience for 




 Lijphart (1996) claimed that India should be considered a consociational polity 
in practice. Yet his analysis was not based on a longitudinal and systematic empirical 
analysis of the extent to which the institutions and policies of the Indian state 
displayed the four key features of consociationalism: grand coalition, minority veto, 
proportionality and segmental autonomy. In this article, we provided an original 
and longitudinal systematic analysis. We did so by relating key institutions such as 
the Union Cabinet, senior political offices in the state, the composition of the Lok 
Sabha, the administrative services and the internal structure of polity-wide parties 
to the consociational yardsticks of grand coalition or proportional representation. 
Similarly, we looked at the extent to which caste groups, minority religions or 
territories possessed the ability to exercise a minority veto or acquired segmental 
autonomy. Our research generates new findings which make an original 
contribution to the understanding of consociationalism in three ways.  
 Firstly, we extend and further deepen early criticisms of Lijphart by Lustick 
(1997), Wilkinson (2000) and Adeney (2002) who argued that it is a stretch too far 
to consider India as a consociation on all elements. Our data clearly bears out that 
minority groups (other than dominant minority groups such as Forward Hindu 
castes) are not systematically co-governing the centre as part of a grand coalition. 
Some representation has been tokenist - allocating key executive portfolios to 
representatives of different groups. Key groups (in particular lower castes and 
Muslims) remain under-represented in relation to their share of the population, be 
it in senior political, administrative or judicial offices. The gap between 
constitutional or legal provision and actual practice is apparent when observing the 
share of unfulfilled positions attributed to lower castes and tribes in the central 
administrative services, although the position continues to improve for these 
groups.  The fact that Narendra Modi was an OBC is a sign of how India’s de facto 
power sharing has opened up the political system to some groups. However, others 
(particularly Muslims) remain excluded despite the presence of other 
consociational elements such as the existence of personal religious laws.  
 
 Secondly, our data confirms the importance of assessing consociationalism 
for different segments of a society, in India as well as elsewhere. Such a 
disaggregated analysis gives mixed evidence for Wilkinson’s assertion that India has 
become more consociational in the post-Nehruvian period. We observed a slight 
increase in the representation of OBCs at the expense of Forward Castes in the Union 
Cabinet, Lok Sabha and senior political offices. Linguistic reorganization and the 
enactment of a set of language laws between 1952 and 1967 also appeared to have 
‘locked in’ linguistic autonomy and transformed the states into territorial political 
communities (Swenden 2017). Coalition government and liberalization post-1989 
strengthened territorial autonomy, helped by the Supreme Court’s resolve to strike 
down political abuses of President’s Rule.  However, the (limited) rise of the 
backward castes and the deepening of territorial autonomy is undermined by the 
gradual weakening in the representation of religious minorities, especially Muslims. 
This can be observed across nearly all pivotal institutions of the state: Cabinet, Lok 
Sabha, polity-wide parties, key political offices. Although Muslims have been under-
represented throughout India’s independent history, their level of representation 
has deteriorated since the mid to late 1990s, mirroring the rise of the BJP.  
 
Thirdly, the Indian case demonstrates the dangers of political systems 
leaving power-sharing to ‘informal rules and practices’ alone. If they are not 
sustained by enforceable constitutional and legal provisions, they run the risk of 
being overturned should the elite consensus change.  Following on from the point 
above, to the extent that the polity – leaving aside society and the economy – 
appears to shut out a minority group which constitutes more than 14% of the 
population, the credentials of India, not just as a consociational democracy (which 
as we argued it never was) but even as a ‘liberal’ democracy appear to be at stake. 
The declining level of support for minority rights demonstrated in the National 
Election Surveys suggests that this trend may continue.  
 
 Finally, our article identifies areas of further research.  More research needs 
to be conducted on levels of consociationalism at the state level in India. The level 
of representation for religious minorities and lower caste groups varies 
considerably across state assemblies and especially in Southern states these groups 
are better represented (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2009). Sometimes this is the result of 
more generous reservation policies, including for Muslims who are more often 
subsumed under OBC quota. This demonstrates that formal measures of minority 
protection help secure the position of non-dominant groups in divided societies, a 
lesson for other countries.  The Indian case also raises wider questions on the 
impact of the electoral system on minority representation and politics. Reservations 
have helped to lift the representation of lower castes and tribes in the legislatures, 
civil service and higher education. However, territorially dispersed minorities 
(religious minorities, Dalits) may have stood a better chance of political 
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